Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics
Contact InformationDuke University Box 90432, 203B West Duke Bldg, Durham, NC 27708
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey Stillman Professor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University. He has secondary appointments in the Law School and the Department of Psychology and Neuroscience, and he is core faculty in the Duke Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences, and the Duke Center for Interdisciplinary Decision Sciences. He serves as Resource Faculty in the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Partner Investigator at the Oxford Centre for Neuroethics, and Research Scientist with The Mind Research Network in New Mexico. He has visited at National Cheng Kung University in Taiwan, the Macquarie Research Center for Agency, Values, and Ethics in Australia, and the National Institutes of Health in Washington. He has received fellowships from the Harvard Program in Ethics and the Professions, the Princeton Center for Human Values, the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, the Center for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics at the Australian National University, and the Sage Center for the Study of the Mind at the University of California, Santa Barbara. He has served as co-chair of the Board of Officers of the American Philosophical Association, co-director of the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project, and co-PI of the project on the Neuroscience and Philosophy of Free Will and Moral Responsibility at Chapman University. He earned his bachelor’s degree from Amherst College and his doctorate from Yale University. He has published widely on ethics (theoretical and applied as well as meta-ethics), empirical moral psychology and neuroscience, philosophy of law, epistemology, philosophy of religion, and informal logic. Most recently, he is the author of Think Again: How to Reason and Argue, Morality Without God?, and Moral Skepticisms; co-author with Robert Fogelin of Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, and with Jesse Summers of Clean Hands: Philosophical Lessons of Scrupulosity; and editor of Moral Psychology, volumes I-V. His numerous articles have appeared in a variety of philosophical, scientific, and popular journals and collections. He performs various experiments in moral psychology and brain science with his Moral Attitudes and Decisions (MAD) Lab. He is working on one book on moral artificial intelligence and another book that will develop a contrastivist view of freedom and responsibility. He co-directs Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNaP) with Felipe De Brigard and teaches a popular MOOC, Think Again, on the Coursera website with Ram Neta.
Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy ["SSNAP2"] awarded by (Principal Investigator). 2020 - 2023
Book Funding: "Free Will? Questions and Answers from Neuroscientists and Philosophers" awarded by Chapman University (Principal Investigator). 2019 - 2020
Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP) awarded by John Templeton Foundation (Principal Investigator). 2016 - 2019
How to Build Ethics into Robust Artificial Intelligence awarded by (Co-Principal Investigator). 2015 - 2018
MAD Lab (Moral Attitudes and Decisions Laboratory) awarded by (Principal Investigator). 2016
- Book Reviews
- Book Sections
- Journal Articles
- Journal Issues
- Conference Papers
- Digital Publications
Ancell, A., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds. Moral Disagreements. LuLu Press, 2015.
Summers, J., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds. Drugs and Addiction. Lulu Press, 2015.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. Moral psychology, volume 4: Free will and moral responsibility, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Robert J. Fogelin. Understanding Arguments, Ninth Edition, Complete Version. Cengage, 2014.
Nadel, L., and W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong. Introduction: Memory in the Legal Context, 2013.
Nadel, L., and W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong. Preface, 2013.
Nadel, L., and W. P. Sinnott-Armstrong. Memory and Law, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199920754.001.0001. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., and S. Sullivan, eds. The Ethics of War and Terrorism. Lulu Press, 2013.
Kiehl, K., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong, eds. Oxford Handbook of Psychopathy and Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Singh, I., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, and J. Savulescu, eds. Bioprediction, Biomarkers, and Bad Behavior. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Adina Roskies. “Alfred R. Mele’s Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will.” Philosophical Books, 2010.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Responsibility and fault.” Law and Philosophy. KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBL, January 1, 2001.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Value judgment: Improving our ethical beliefs.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, January 2000.
Sinnott‐Armstrong, Walter. “Book ReviewRuth Chang, , ed.Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997. Pp. ix+303. $57.50 (cloth); $24.95 (paper)..” Ethics. University of Chicago Press, October 1999. https://doi.org/10.1086/233210. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. Springer Verlag (Germany), 1999.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Morality, Normativity, and Society.” The Philosophical Review, October 1996.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Morality and Action.” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 1996.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “The Structure of Justification.” The Philosophical Quarterly. Wiley: 24 months, July 1995.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Moral Imagination.” Mind. Oxford University Press (OUP): Policy F - Oxford Open Option G, July 1994.
Henne, P., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “Does neuroscience undermine morality?.” In Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience, 54–67, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190460723.003.0004. Full Text
De Figueiredo, J. M., M. Lenox, F. Oberholzer-Gee, and R. G. Vanden Bergh. “Introduction,” 34:xiii–xxiv, 2016.
Hawkins, J. “Commentary on Kim: Decision-making capacity and value.” In Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New Perspectives, 204–13, 2015. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315688725. Full Text
Strohminger, N., B. Caldwell, D. Cameron, J. S. Borg, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “Implicit morality: A methodological survey.” In Experimental Ethics: Toward an Empirical Moral Philosophy, 133–56, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137409805. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Introduction,” xiii–xviii, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Do Psychopaths Refute Internalism?.” In Being Amoral: Psychopathy and Moral Incapacity, edited by Thomas Schramme. MIT Press, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Moral Disagreements with Psychopaths.” In Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, edited by Michael Bergmann. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, and Adina Roskies. “Introduction to Neuroscience and Society.” In The Cognitive Neurosciences V, edited by Michael Gazzaniga and Ronald Mangum. MIT Press, 2014.
McDonald, Kelsey, Siyuan Yin, Tara Weese, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. “Do framing effects debunk moral beliefs?.” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (September 11, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x18002662. Full Text
Ancell, Aaron J., and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. “The need for feasible compromises on conscientious objection: response to Card..” Journal of Medical Ethics 45, no. 8 (August 2019): 560–61. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2019-105425. Full Text
Murray, S., E. D. Murray, G. Stewart, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, and F. De Brigard. “Responsibility for forgetting.” Philosophical Studies 176, no. 5 (May 1, 2019): 1177–1201. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1053-3. Full Text
Harris, Adrianne A., Adrienne L. Romer, Eleanor K. Hanna, Lori A. Keeling, Kevin S. LaBar, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Timothy J. Strauman, Henry Ryan Wagner, Marsha D. Marcus, and Nancy L. Zucker. “The central role of disgust in disorders of food avoidance..” Int J Eat Disord 52, no. 5 (May 2019): 543–53. https://doi.org/10.1002/eat.23047. Full Text
Henne, P., J. Semler, V. Chituc, F. De Brigard, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture.” Philosophia (United States) 47, no. 1 (March 15, 2019): 131–39. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9944-7. Full Text
Stanley, M. L., S. Yin, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “A reason-based explanation for moral dumbfounding.” Judgment and Decision Making 14, no. 2 (March 1, 2019): 120–29.
Vierkant, Tillmann, Robert Deutschländer, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and John-Dylan Haynes. “Responsibility Without Freedom? Folk Judgements About Deliberate Actions..” Frontiers in Psychology 10 (January 2019). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01133. Full Text
McDonald, Kelsey, Siyuan Yin, Tara Weese, and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. “Do framing effects debunk moral beliefs?.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42 (January 1, 2019).
Cameron, C Daryl, B Keith Payne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Julian A. Scheffer, and Michael Inzlicht. “Corrigendum to "Implicit moral evaluations: A multinomial modeling approach" [Cognition 158 (2017) 224-241]..” Cognition 173 (April 2018). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.12.012. Full Text
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. “Special Issue: Pardo and Patterson on Neuroscience and the Law.” Neuroethics, 2011.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W., and F. Schauer. “Introduction.” Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy, 2008.
. Steven B. “Evidence and Law.” Edited by W. Sinnott-Armstrong and F. Schauer. Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy, 2008.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Section B: Ethics.” Interdisciplinary Core Philosophy, Philosophical Issues, 2008.
. W. “Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation.” Edited by S. Brison and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. Boston University Law Review. Boston University. School of Law. The Boston University School of Law, September 1992.
Kramer, M. F., J. Schaich Borg, V. Conitzer, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “When Do People Want AI to Make Decisions?.” In Aies 2018 Proceedings of the 2018 Aaai/Acm Conference on Ai, Ethics, and Society, 204–9, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1145/3278721.3278752. Full Text
Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Mathematics, Isaim 2018, 2018.
Freedman, R., J. P. Dickerson, J. S. Borg, W. Sinnott-Armstrong, and V. Conitzer. “Adapting a kidney exchange algorithm to align with human values.” In 32nd Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2018, 1636–43, 2018.
Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In 31st Aaai Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Aaai 2017, 4831–35, 2017.
Conitzer, V., W. Sinnott-Armstrong, J. S. Borg, Y. Deng, and M. Kramer. “Moral decision making frameworks for artificial intelligence.” In Aaai Workshop Technical Report, WS-17-01-WS-17-15:105–9, 2017.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Explanation and justification in moral epistemology.” In Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol 1, edited by K. Brinkmann, 117–27. PHILOSOPHY DOCUMENTATION CTR, 1999.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “My Brain Made Me Do It — So What?.” Oxford Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics, March 2015.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Does Philosophy Matter?.” Oxford University Press blog, March 2015.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “My Brain Made Me Do It, but Does that Matter?.” The Conversation, December 2014.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Moral Skepticism.” Standford University, 2004.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Consequentialism.” Stanford University, 2003.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Does Neuroscience Undermine Free Will?.” Slate, n.d.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Intentions and Consequences in the Modern World.” The Center for Humans & Nature, John Templeton Foundation, n.d.
Roskies, A., and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Thinking about Morality,” n.d.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “What is Philosophy?.” Dartmouth, n.d.
Sinnott-Armstrong, W. “Induction vs. Deduction.” Dartmouth, n.d.