Felipe De Brigard

Felipe De Brigard

Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy

Overview

Most of my research focuses on the way in which memory and imagination interact. So far, I have explored ways in which episodic memory both guides and constrains episodic counterfactual thinking (i.e., thoughts about alternative ways in which past personal events could have occurred), and how this interaction affects the perceived plausibility of imagined counterfactual events. I also explore the differential contribution of episodic and semantic memory in the generation of different kinds of counterfactual simulations, as well as the effect of counterfactual thinking on the memories they derive from. In addition, my research attempts to understand how prior experience helps to constrain the way in which we reconstruct episodic memories. Finally, I am also interested in the role of internal attention during conscious recollection. To address these issues I use behavioral and functional magnetic resonance imaging techniques, as well as the conceptual rigor of philosophical analysis.

Education & Training

  • Post Doctoral Fellow, Philosophy, Harvard University 2011 - 2013

  • Ph.D., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2011

  • Visiting Instructor, Philosophy, Elon University 2009 - 2010

  • M.A., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 2007

  • M.A., Tufts University 2005

  • A.B., Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Colombia) 2002

Stanley, Matthew L., Gregory W. Stewart, and Felipe De Brigard. “Counterfactual Plausibility and Comparative Similarity..” Cognitive Science 41 Suppl 5 (May 2017): 1216–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12451. Full Text Open Access Copy

Henne, P., Á. Pinillos, and F. De Brigard. “Cause by Omission and Norm: Not Watering Plants.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 270–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2016.1182567. Full Text

Stanley, Matthew L., Natasha Parikh, Gregory W. Stewart, and Felipe De Brigard. “Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking..” Consciousness and Cognition 48 (February 2017): 283–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2016.12.013. Full Text

De Brigard, F. “Responsibility and the relevance of alternative future possibilities.” Teoria 37, no. 2 (January 1, 2017): 25–35.

De Brigard, Felipe, Timothy F. Brady, Luka Ruzic, and Daniel L. Schacter. “Tracking the emergence of memories: A category-learning paradigm to explore schema-driven recognition..” Memory & Cognition 45, no. 1 (January 2017): 105–20. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-016-0643-6. Full Text

De Brigard, Felipe, Kelly S. Giovanello, Gregory W. Stewart, Amber W. Lockrow, Margaret M. O’Brien, and R Nathan Spreng. “Characterizing the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking in healthy younger and older adults..” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (2006) 69, no. 12 (December 2016): 2358–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2015.1115529. Full Text

Chituc, Vladimir, Paul Henne, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and Felipe De Brigard. “Blame, not ability, impacts moral "ought" judgments for impossible actions: Toward an empirical refutation of "ought" implies "can"..” Cognition 150 (May 2016): 20–25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2016.01.013. Full Text

Henne, P., V. Chituc, F. De Brigard, and W. Sinnott-Armstrong. “An Empirical Refutation of 'Ought' Implies 'Can'.” Analysis (United Kingdom) 76, no. 3 (January 1, 2016): 283–90. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anw041. Full Text

De Brigard, F. “Consciousness and moral responsibility.” Analysis (United Kingdom) 75, no. 4 (October 1, 2015): 661–67. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv012. Full Text

De Brigard, Felipe, R. Nathan Spreng, Jason P. Mitchell, and Daniel L. Schacter. “Neural activity associated with self, other, and object-based counterfactual thinking..” Neuroimage 109 (April 2015): 12–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.12.075. Full Text

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