Neander is the author of numerous papers, including:
“The Teleological Notion of ‘Function’” in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 69, No. 4, December 1991, pp. 454-468. Reprinted in Function, Selection, and Design (The State University of New York Press) ed., by David Buller (1998).
“Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning” in Philosophical Studies, Vol. 79, No. 2, August 1995, pp. 109-141. Excerpted in Function, Selection, and Design (The State University of New York Press) ed., by David Buller (1998).
“Pruning the Tree of Life” in British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 46, pp. 59-80, March 1995.
“Swampman Meets Swampcow” in Mind & Language, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 118-129.
“The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness” in Philosophical Perspectives, 12: Language, Mind and Ontology, A Supplement to NOUS, edited by James E. Tomberlin (Blackwells, 1998), pp. 411-434.
“Fitness and the Fate of Unicorns” in Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays, edited by Valerie Hardcastle (Bradford, MIT Press; Cambridge, Mass: 1999) 3-26.
“Types of Traits: The Importance of Functional Homologues” in Functions: New Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, edited by Andre Ariew, Robert Cummins and Mark Perlman (Oxford University Press, 2002).
“Content for Cognitive Science” in Teleosemantics, edited by David Papineau and Gary McDonald (2005, Oxford University Press).
This argues against Millikan's admonishments to the contrary that a teleosemantic theory of mental content can be a causal theory of content. Objections to the effect that functions are selected effects and so are not causes are mistaken about what follows from an etiological theory of functions. There can be information carrying functions on an appropriate understanding of natural functions and natural information.
A response to the circularity objection to an etiological theory of functions and critique of the modal theory of functions.
This paper discusses how traits are to be classified, not by functions, but for the purpose of ascribing functions to them.