

**Lynn S. Joy  
Professor of Philosophy  
University of Notre Dame**

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### **Hume's Newtonianism of the Mind**

**Hume's relationship to Newton has a double aspect. On the one hand, he aspired to be the Newton of the mind, explaining how the regularities in our experience of mental and moral phenomena are analyzable in terms comparable to the law-like relations of moving bodies. But, on the other hand, Hume rejected the Newtonian belief in a God whose laws govern the natural world, a belief presupposed by Newtonian conceptions of causal powers and laws of nature. Based partly on this rejection, his criticisms of Newton's concept of force and Locke's view of the causal power of the will resulted in his denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. Hume, as a moral psychologist, could thus argue that there are no necessary connections between our beliefs, motives, and actions--all of which he took to be distinct existences. However, as a Newton of the mind, he still sought to explain how our minds possess a natural disposition to associate our impressions and ideas as cause and effect. Yet his account of such a natural disposition of the mind threatened to undermine his denial of necessary connections between distinct existences. This paper examines the double aspect of Hume's science of the mind.**